The implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy has drawn strong criticism. Commentators have highlighted its inefficiency and the weak institutional and legal frameworks that have so far characterized this domain. An especially vexed issue is the legal nature of the ENP instruments so far developed by EU actors. This article explores the impact the Lisbon Treaty has had on the definition of ENP tools. I observe that, although some clear features of the new primary-law framework suggest the need for "formalized" ENP tools, the ENP, and in particular its southern dimension, continues to be implemented for the most part by means of soft-law instruments. Despite an undeniable evolution of nonbinding ENP tools, a similar trend could jeopardize the development of the ENP as a whole. I argue that a broader recourse to multilateral or bilateral agreements could make the ENP more effective while strengthening its democratic accountability: a new ENP model based on treaty cooperation would exclude neither flexibility nor a complementary or parallel recourse to soft-law instruments, and would at the same time make the actors involved more accountable, all the while enabling stronger cooperation, at the EU level, between the EU's institutions and its Member States.
bilateral action plans agreed to with neighbourhood countries. The action plans (or association agendas for Eastern partner countries) are conceived as the main instruments for implementing the general existing agreements between the EU and its neighbours (i.e., association agreements and partnership-and-cooperation agreements): the European Commission has described these plans as "political documents -drawing together existing and future work in the full range of the EU's relations with its neighbours" 6 -but they nonetheless represent a significant step forward on the way to defining the ENP. 7 Indeed, it should be noted that action plans are usually adopted as a recommendation of the Association Agreement Council or the Partnership Cooperation Council concerned. It thus follows, to borrow the words of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Deutsche Shell, that
[s]ince measures emanating from bodies which have been established by an international agreement [...] , and which have been entrusted with responsibility for its implementation, are directly linked to the agreement which they implement, they form part of the [EU] legal order. 8 The incorporation of ENP action plans in the EU legal order is not without consequences as far as their legal status is concerned. In the first place, it suggests the possibility of invoking the consistent-interpretation doctrine by analogy to the ECJ's application of it to EU internal nonbinding instruments, 9 with the consequence that EU actors would have to interpret inherent EU law in light of the wording and purpose of the action plans. But, on closer inspection, the ECJ's case law itself seems to suggest that the duties imposed on EU actors may also go beyond. To go back to the ECJ's words in Deutsche Shell, although the action plans (or equivalent documents) adopted under the umbrella of association or partnership-and-cooperation agreements cannot confer upon individuals rights which they may enforce before national courts, the latter are nevertheless obliged to take them into consideration in order to resolve disputes submitted to them, especially when, as in this case, they are of relevance in interpreting the provisions of the [Agreements] .
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In brief, because action plans are so closely kinked to the association and partnershipand-cooperation agreements they seek to implement, they should influence not only the way in which these agreements (as well as inherent EU law) are interpreted by institutional actors, but also the way they are applied.
11 On the other hand, action plans are also especially relevant as concerns good faith, since the good-faith principle requires the actors concerned not to contradict their own conduct and, consequently, not to renege on the "commitments" expressed in the action plans. That said, the content of ENP action plans or equivalent documents is still often too vague and openended, thus leaving must leeway to the actors involved in their implementation.
Against this backdrop, the Lisbon reform has paved the way for a further "formalization" of the ENP. The main result of this process lies the introduction of a specific Treaty provision devoted to the ENP, namely, Article 8 TEU.
12 The provision starts out by defining the objectives of the European policy and the binding mandate of EU engagement:
The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.
It then significantly lays special emphasis on recourse to international treaties in establishing and maintaining relationships with the EU neighbours. Article 8 TEU states, in this regard, that [f] or the purpose of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be subject of periodic consultation.
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From a theoretical standpoint, the role Article 8 TEU is called on to play is thus twofold. On the one hand, the provision, in line with the Lisbon Treaty's general reshaping of the Union's external action, 13 clarifies the contents of the ENP and implicitly recognizes that -despite the ENP's placement within the TEU -the policy now ranks as a formal strand of the EU's external relations: the references to EU values is particularly relevant in this regard, since it echoes the general formula contained in Article 21(1) TEU, to some extent considered the "constitutional clause" of the EU's external action.
14 On the other hand, as a further consequence of this recognition, the provision makes it clear that the main instrument for implementing the ENP should be the ordinary one provided for in the EU's external-relations toolbox, namely, the international agreement. In short, Article 8 TEU suggests that the preexisting pragmatic (or soft) approach to the ENP needs to be superseded by embracing a new conception of the policy, a conception on which primacy is accorded to the Union's normative (or hard) power. 17 A catalyst role can be expected to be played here by the so-called "more for more" conditionality mechanism, based on the concrete performances of the States concerned, and which is also envisaged in the new Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.
18 What is interesting to note for the present purposes is that the 2011 joint communication -in line with the pragmatic, project-centred approach of the pre-Lisbon era -suggests that such a mechanism should be implemented chiefly by means of soft-law instruments. On the other hand, the post-Lisbon lawmaking in that domain seems to mirror the approach that emerged from the strategic documents. It will suffice to mention, in this regard, the Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, 26 which the European Commission adopted at the end of 2011 so as to align the general ENP facility with the new policy vision. Not surprisingly, this proposal essentially rehashes the existing ENP toolbox. 27 Indeed, under Article 3(1) of the proposal, the general framework for EU support -and it is significant here that the proposal prefers to speak of a "policy framework" -should consist of In essence, these examples make it clear that the ENP is still being conceived by EU actors as a Janus-faced process, where hard-law instruments (in particular, the international agreements) must necessarily coexist with a significant number of soft-law instruments, the latter regarded as the only ones capable of ensuring the flexibility and Though appealing, this view turns out, on closer scrutiny, to be unconvincing. There are indeed a number of elements that suggest a different approach to the ENP's implementation process.
In general, it should be borne in mind that not only soft-law instruments but also international agreements can make for flexibility and differentiation. International practice shows much recourse to different types of legal devices to promote the widest possible acceptance of international agreements (e.g., reservations, "pick and choose" methods, ad hoc clauses, and protocols): for one thing, these devices lessen the legal burden that would otherwise be imposed on contracting parties, and, for another, they can make it possible to confer a distinctive status to some contracting parties in view of their special interests or peculiar features. As is apparent from the European integration process, both EU institutions and Member States alike are very familiar with this type of issue.
28 But what is particularly interesting to note for the present purposes is that some traces of this attitude -i.e., flexibility by means of treaty-based law -can also be found in the relationships the EU has already established with its neighbours. This can be appreciated, for example, in Article 24 of the Energy Community Treaty (ECT), which the European Union has concluded with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro Serbia, Ukraine, and UNMIK, with a view to establishing an Integrated Energy Market Organisation in southeast Europe. 29 Indeed, under this provision, the adaptation and evolution of the Energy Community acquis must take into account "both the institutional framework of this Treaty [the ECT] and the specific situation of each of the Contracting Parties." 30 As has rightly been pointed out by Blockmans and Van Vooren, the ECT gives us a case study (also mentioned by them is the cooperation the EU and its eastern partners maintain on transport) that clearly illustrates the possibility of bringing a "legally binding sectoral multilateralism" to bear on the new ENP. This approach, based on sectoral multilateral agreements between the Union and its neighbours, 31 offers several advantages in implementing the ENP.
Overall, it seems more effective at striking the right balance between the binding mandate contained in Article 8 TEU -and hence the new shape the Treaty drafters sought to give the ENP -and the need for flexibility and differentiation. Indeed, aside from making it possible to craft multilateral sectoral agreements in such a way as to recognize the contracting parties' specificities, sectoral multilateralism also enables these parties to adopt other tailor-made binding or nonbinding instruments. example, in some cases political or practical reasons might make it impossible to set up multilateral contractual relations between the Union and its neighbours, and in these cases, the EU and its partners could thus negotiate bilateral agreements. 32 At the same time, implementing the ENP by means of international agreements does not rule out the possibility of resorting in parallel to soft-law instruments so as to support and integrate the legally binding multilateral or bilateral cooperation. And only when it becomes apparent that international agreements (whether multilateral or bilateral) are unavailable should we look at the possibility of mainly implementing neighbourhood cooperation by means of soft-law tools. Furthermore, wide recourse to multilateral sectoral agreements would contribute to overcoming the dichotomy between the ENP's multilateral dimension and its bilateral dimension. Indeed, this dichotomy turns out to be rather artificial, for practical experience shows that in many cases there is significant overlap between these two dimensions (or, stated otherwise, the theoretical dichotomy tends to melt away in the practical implementation of the ENP).
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At EU level, the advantages flowing from such an approach should equal those highlighted with regard to the relationship between the Union and its neighbours. First, broad recourse to binding instruments would ensure a proper involvement of the European Parliament in the ENP, in line with the growing role the Lisbon Treaty attributes to that institution when it comes to implementing the EU's external action. 34 Second, in light of the general Loyalty Clause codified in Article 4(3) TEU, 35 this different approach would imply stronger loyalty duties than those emerging from the previously discussed Deutsche Shell case. 36 This circumstance turns out to be particularly relevant if one considers, on the one hand, the way the ECJ has interpreted the loyal-cooperation duties of EU institutions and Member States on the international scene, 37 and on the other the fact that inherent EU action can often lead to overlaps 32 Consider, for example, the way the Union is cooperating with some neighbours on visas and illegal migration. 33 The need for greater balance between multilateralism and bilateralism has recently been highlighted with regard to the ENP's southern dimension in Jan Wouters 38 More to the point, since the Member States' duties stemming from the Loyalty Clause are increasingly being understood by the Court mainly in terms of abstention obligations (even in relation to mixed agreements), 39 the Union's adoption of binding instruments could avert the risk of jeopardizing the ENP's implementation. At the same time, that same strategy could also help solve the problems arising out of the way competences are allocated between the EU and its Member States -another element which has prevented so far EU actors from implementing the ENP by way of binding instruments. Last, but not least, broad recourse to binding instruments is likely to improve legal certainty for the natural and legal persons involved in the ENP's implementation, while affording greater protection of their inherent rights.
Conclusions
In a new joint communication of 20 March 2013, the European Commission and the HR assess the developments and results of the revised ENP launched in 2011. 40 Significantly, the communication underlines the importance of sector cooperation, inviting the EU to reflect on how to progressively extend the geographic scope of these instruments [i.e., the existing sectoral multilateral agreement] to open them to other ENP partners, or on developing with willing partners sector arrangements like the transport community with countries of the Western Balkans.
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It remains to be seen whether this policy suggestion will be taken up, in such a way as to make it possible to actually move beyond current practice, or whether, on the contrary, in reading the joint communication of 2013 -with 
